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REVIEWS OF BOOKS.

L'année philosophique. Publiée sous la direction de F. PILLON. (Quinzième année, 1904.) Paris, Félix Alcan, 1905. — pp. 1–316.

The fifteenth volume of the *Année philosophique* contains four articles and ninety reviews of books which have appeared in France during the year 1904. The first contribution is by G. Rodier, "La cohérence de la morale stoïcienne" (pp. 1–37). Attention has long ago been called to certain inconsistencies in the ethical system of the Stoics. M. Rodier thinks that the criticisms are not well founded, that Stoic ethics, at least in its oldest and most authoritative representatives, was free from the contradictions which have been urged against it. Just as the Stoics attempted to establish a theory of knowledge doing away with the opposition between sensible and rational knowledge, so they tried to set up an ethical system by repudiating the dualism between nature and reason which Plato and Aristotle had taught. The primitive instinct of every creature is the preservation and development of its own nature. Now the proper nature of man is his reason; hence his highest good consists in living according to reason. To live according to our individual reason or according to universal reason is one. Every fault is an error and every error is a contradiction. To understand the events and to see their rational necessity is to submit to them and to wish them. The sage understands this necessity and wishes it; his desires are always in harmony with the events and with his conduct; there is always a perfect ὁμολογία between his acts and his character. In the fool there is discord between his desire, the things, and his acts. Our conduct, like everything else in the world, is rigidly determined. We can say that it depends on us in the sense that our moral nature is an indispensable element in its determination. Looking at things absolutely, there is nothing contrary to nature; a thing contrary to nature is impossible if we understand by nature the whole of existence and universal reason. The acts of the fool as well as those of the sage are necessary parts of the chain of events; the act performed is always necessary and good. From the moral standpoint, the matter of the act is always indifferent; that which counts is the form, *i. e.*, the inner attitude of him who does it. However contrary to the instinct of self-preservation, or any other instinct, the conduct of the sage may be, it

is nevertheless morally perfect because it is accompanied by the consciousness of its necessity.

From this conception, M. Rodier believes, follow the consequences which have always been called the paradoxes of the Stoics: The sage is supremely happy because he attains the perfection of human nature; he is free and all-powerful, for everything which he wishes is realized. The acts of the fool, however rational in themselves, always remain irrational in his eyes because he cannot penetrate to their causes. What seems a crime to us is an act of virtue when the sage performs it. A single act of virtue implies complete and perfect virtue, for to comprehend the necessity of the least of events in a whole like the universe, it is necessary to have absolute knowledge. There are no degrees of goodness any more than there are degrees of truth. Virtue is omniscience; the thought of the sage is identical with the divine thought, or at least it is its reflection.

As the Stoics themselves confessed, this ideal is almost unattainable. We cannot know in each instance what universal reason demands. Hence the thing for us is to note what are the ends aimed at by nature in a majority of cases, what is the *normal* object of the natural tendencies of man. To have desires in accord with these will keep us in harmony with universal reason sufficiently often. In this consists the καθῆκον; it is the search for the preferable things or the most frequent ends of nature. Here probability must be our guide. Hence the Stoics teach two sovereign goods, between which there is nothing in common. The one is not an attenuation or condition or application of the other. They do not concern the same persons. The first consists in a complete knowledge of things, which is supposed to be wholly lacking in the second. Of these two morals, the one ideal, the other practical, professed by the founders of Stoicism, the first was preferred by some of their successors, the second by others; still other followers, though adhering to the distinction, developed one or the other; others finally confused the two standpoints.

M. Rodier shows, what has often been shown, that many seeming paradoxes in the Stoic ethics really follow from certain fundamental premises. But he does not prove that there are no inconsistencies between the teachings of the different Stoics and that the original Stoic system is a self-consistent whole. The Stoic philosophy underwent changes in the course of time; it was influenced, positively and negatively, by other systems of thought and by the demands of practical life, as historians of philosophy have often pointed out. Though the earlier systems showed more logical consistency than the later

ones, they too contained doctrines not easily reconcilable with each other. The metaphysical and ethical teachings do not always harmonize; there is a conflict between the monistic principles of the former and the irrepressible dualism of the latter. The universe is a cosmos; everything in it is determined, a necessary part of a beautiful and perfect whole. If this is so, then every act and every desire is necessary and good and in harmony with the All, the wise man's as well as the fool's, the good man's as well as the knave's. Here we have monism, determinism, and optimism. But evidently human nature is not in full accord with universal nature, as witness the great preponderance of fools and rascals in the world. This is pessimism. The wise man's reason alone, we are told, is in harmony with the world-reason. But there seems to be a conflict in the wise man's soul also, an irrational, unnatural element which he must eradicate, pleasure and pain, desire and fear, which must be brought under the heel of reason. So there is a dualism between reason and sensibility after all. We can get rid of this difficulty by saying that the value of an act depends on the attitude of the agent, upon his knowledge and acceptance of its necessity. But in that case there is no reason why the wise man should eradicate his passions so long as he understands their causes and knows their place in the universal economy. The fool, on the other hand, who does not understand and will not submit, is something of a riddle; his acts are all formally bad and materially good, but his folly is just as necessary as the wise man's wisdom. Under these circumstances it would certainly be folly to be wise. Finally, it is not easy to reconcile the metaphysical determinism of the Stoic philosophy with its ethical freedom. The Stoic tells us to eradicate our passions and that we can do this, that it lies with us to do it or not. At the same time he tells us that everything is determined and that the proper attitude is to submit to this necessity. Freedom, in other words, consists in understanding necessity and submitting to it. On this teaching the man who understands his passions and submits to them is free, while he who conquers them is not free. It is no wonder that some of the later Stoics modified the system and sought to adapt it to practical life.

The second paper, "L'union de l'âme et du corps d'après Descartes" (pp. 39–50) is by O. Hamelin. His thesis is that, though occasionalism is a logical consequence of Descartes's principles, Descartes explicitly teaches the union of soul and body. This union, M. Hamelin asserts, he conceives as a substantial union: soul is not in the body as a pilot in his boat, but confused and mixed with the body so that

both form together a single whole. Hence it is necessary to conceive the soul as in a certain sense extended and the body as in a way partaking of the nature of the soul. This theory Descartes plainly borrowed from the School. It is a realistic, contradictory, and verbal hypothesis, for which reasons the logic of history neglected it and recognized occasionalism as in spirit and truth the sole Cartesian doctrine with respect to the relation of mind and body.

M. Hamelin is right in stating what everybody knows, that Descartes taught a kind of union of soul and body which was not consistent with his dualistic principles. But M. Hamelin lays too much stress upon certain passages in Descartes's writings which assert the *substantial* unity of mind and body. Such passages certainly exist, but so do many others contradicting this view. The fact is, the problem gave Descartes a great deal of trouble, and caused a great deal of uncertainty on his part. His extreme dualism makes interaction impossible, and yet the facts, for which the philosopher always had a wholesome regard, seem to contradict his theory. When questioned about the relation, he often dodges the issue or gives evasive answers, or tells us "that it is one of those things which are known by themselves and which we obscure every time we aim to explain them by others." "The human mind," he says in one of his letters, "is not able to comprehend clearly both the essential difference between mind and body and their union, for it would have to conceive both as a single being and at the same time as two substances, and that is contradictory." His metaphysics protests against interaction, but experience seems to prove it. How the mind acts upon the body, Descartes cannot quite make out, but he considers nearly every possibility, even the scholastic conception of substantial union. It is fair to say that he taught occasionalism, *unio substantialis*, and *unitas compositionis*, and that of all these teachings the old scholastic one is the least prominent. His successors saw the contradictions in the different doctrines and boldly came out for what the logic of the system seemed to demand.

The third article, "La critique de Bayle: Critique des attributs métaphysiques de Dieu, aséité ou existence nécessaire" (pp. 51–131), by M. Pillon, is a continuation of the papers published by the same author in the two preceding numbers of the journal. It examines and criticises, from the neo-Critical standpoint, the views and arguments of Bayle and a number of later philosophers on the notion of necessary existence. For the schoolmen *aseitas* was a necessary attribute of perfection and could belong only to God, the perfect being. Descartes

introduces into this teaching the notion of positive causality. But it is absurd to say that a being causes its own existence and that its existence follows logically from its essence. God can exist by himself only negatively, *i. e.*, God's existence has no kind of cause. Kant shows that we cannot demonstrate the existence of a necessary being; the notion of a necessary being is not a constitutive principle, but a regulative principle, an ideal. The trouble with Kant, however, is that he, like Descartes and Leibniz, is an infinitist; he holds that no principle of reason obliges us ever to suspend the chain of causes. It is meaningless, according to M. Pillon, to ask what is the cause of the first cause.

Caterus in his objections to Descartes, which Bayle reproduces, sees no reason for limiting the notion of negative *aseitas* to God. Why, he asks, can it not belong to something imperfect, unconscious? Kant compares it to space. Clarke conceives space as a necessary property of the substance which exists *per se;* the necessity of space leads us necessarily to that of God. Butler, a critic of Clarke, objects that space exists by itself as absolutely as anything can exist by itself. Gassendi holds that space is conceived as necessary and uncreated; it forms a special category which we can add to the traditional categories of substance and accident. Pascal agrees with this. Bayle submits the trilemma: We must say either, spatial extension is God himself, which is impious; or, it is nothing, which is absurd; or, it is an uncreated being distinct from God and the body and mind, which is both impious and absurd. According to Bossuet, space is a contingent reality; God created the receptacle as well as the content. Spencer in his last work says the theist and the agnostic alike must conceive space as "inherent, eternal, uncreated — as anteceding all creation, if creation has taken place, and all evolution, if evolution has taken place." "Without origin and cause infinite space has ever existed and must ever exist." Spatial realism thus leads us to make of space a first being, a passive God. According to M. Pillon the question, Whence comes space? can only mean, Whence comes the idea of space? Bayle ought to have recognized the doctrine of the ideality of space in the intelligible extension of Malebranche. The category of space should not be placed on the same level with the other laws of the human mind; it is, as Kant says, a form of the sensibility. Time, however, is not, as such, an intuition, as Kant holds, a real form of sensibility. Moreover, space is the *a priori* form only of touch and sight. But it is not a necessary form of the human or the divine mind; this law of representation, so different from the

others, is a free creation of the Supreme Being. The non-Euclidean geometries seem to our author to support this conclusion.

M. Pillon next takes up Bayle's criticisms of the atomic theories and shows that the hypothesis of solid atoms, like that of the void, is a necessary product of realistic logic. If, however, spatial extension is subjective, then the extension and movements of atoms must be subjective also. Idealism boldly suppresses the little, physically indivisible solid, leaving only the spiritual unity, the indivisible consciousness. Atomism gives way to monadism; space, the passive God, and the atom, the active God, give way to the sole reality, present in all things, to spirit. Necessary existence belongs only to one or more consciousnesses. The doctrine of the ideality of space also clears up the problem of infinity. The actual infinity of quantity does not differ from the infinity of numbers, which is but potential; it signifies not an infinite existence, but the infinite void of corporeal existence, and the infinite void is nothing but the totality of the undefined possibilities of coexistence. Pushed to its logical consequences, idealism leaves only a finite number of monad consciousnesses. But inductive logic does not permit us to rest satisfied with this hypothesis. It seems natural to regard the subconscious individualities which the inferior monads are, as *objets fabriqués* and *agents subordonnés*. They exist for the formation and development of higher monads or clear consciousness. Is there not here a finality which they do not know, which they have not determined, and which must have been conceived and determined by some spirit? Their antagonisms are dominated by a higher unity of order and harmony of which space gives us the sensible image, and which Leibniz felt bound to explain by the all-powerful causative action of a Supreme Monad. The principle of the subjectivity of space, boldly admitted with all its consequences, pierces the veil which has hidden this first cause from reason, and gives to the cosmological and teleological proofs, established upon new and surer foundations, the value of which the Transcendental Dialectic had deprived them.

M. Pillon's series of articles on the Evolution of Idealism in the Eighteenth Century, which was begun in 1893, and of which the present one is a part, forms a valuable contribution to the history of philosophy. Whether we accept the author's own philosophy or not, we cannot fail to be instructed by his expositions and criticisms, which are thorough, clear, and unusually interesting. His own metaphysical system, which is a modified Leibnizianism grafted on a Kantian stock, is open to most of the objections made against the monadology, but these need not concern us here.

"La logique du sentiment," the last article (pp. 133–164), by L. Dauriac, is a discussion of Ribot's *Logique des sentiments*, or rather an attempt to justify a *logic* of feeling. The author elaborates his views on formal logic as a kind of preface to Ribot's book. A logic separated from the world of things is the most barren of disciplines, and a formal logic of sentiments would be inconceivable. But the logic of concepts is based on psychology; its material is derived from perception and sensation. In the same way, M. Dauriac thinks, we can have a logic of the emotions; in the sense, namely, that we reason under the influence of feeling with a material different from that which the intellect employs. The will to live is the source of this logic, and hence desire and belief; for we cannot live without desiring, and without believing the object of our desire to be good. M. Dauriac simply shows that there is such a thing as a psychology of reasoning, and that our reasoning is influenced by our emotions, our desires, and our beliefs. But why we should call this branch of study logic, I do not see unless, of course, we reduce logic to psychology. The rest of the volume (pp. 165–314) is devoted to reviews of books, nearly all of which are from the able pen of M. Pillon, the editor.

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Studies in the Philosophy of Religion. By GEORGE GALLOWAY. Edinburgh and London, William Blackwood & Sons, 1904. — pp. 328.

The book before us is a collection of six essays on various aspects of the Philosophy of Religion. A reading of the book, however, shows a unity of thought and exposition not suggested by the modest title or by the headings of the several essays. Instead of an aggregation of loosely related papers, we find in reality a systematic treatment of the subject. The central aim is to synthesize the opposing standpoints of rationalism and pragmatism.

The first essay is historical. It outlines the main tendencies in religious philosophy from Hegel to Professor James. Besides Hegel, Biedermann and Principal Caird are cited as representatives of absolute rationalism. Pfleiderer stands for a more moderate rationalism. He recognizes both the rights of the theoretical reason and the ideals of the practical reason. Lotze is next considered, and recognized as having materially influenced the subsequent development of the philosophy of religion. "Lotze's continued reiteration of the view that the formal activity of thought could not give the content of reality, and that the categories of logic could neither do justice to the processes of